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Abstract 
This study investigates The Relationship between agency theory and the theory of signaling on Voluntary 
Disclosure . empirically the research data is collected from 70 firms in the Tehran Security Exchange (TSE) 
during 2009-2014.multiple regressions technique is used for examining the stated hypotheses. It is used for, two 
models. The first model is based on agency theory and the second model is based on signaling theory.The 
relationship between ratio of fixed assets, Leverage, ROE, Liquidity on the level of voluntary disclosure.. In 
order to examine the hypotheses, data is collected from the annual reports of the companies using official 
bulletins of the Tehran stock exchange, mainly, through Novin software, Tadbir Pardaz software, and stock sites 
such as www.rdis.ir & www.irbourse.com.The results indicate that based on the models, ratio of fixed assets, 
and, Liquidity are associated significantly and positively with the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Keywords:  agency theory,   signaling theory,  voluntary disclosure 
 
1.INTRODUCTION 
Transparency and disclosure represent one of the pillars of corporate governance. Several scandals have occurred 
worldwide due to lack or improper corporate disclosures. Different stakeholders use corporate disclosure in their 
decision-making process. Disclosure is defined in the accounting literature as “informing the public by financial 
statements of the firm”. Disclosure is also defined as “the communication of economic information, whether 
financial or nonfinancial, quantitative or otherwise concerning a company’s financial position and performance” 
(Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Corporate disclosure falls into two broad categories: mandatory and voluntary. On one 
hand, mandatory disclosure consists of information disclosed in order to comply with the requirements of laws 
and regulations. Voluntary disclosure is the disclosure that exceeds what is recommended by law and represents 
a free choice from managers to disclose additional information (Meek et al, 1995). In this sense, voluntary 
disclose is a choice, just like other accounting choices regarding recognition and measurement of economic 
transactions (for instance FIFO or LIFO for inventory). But why would managers and/or companies choose to 
disclose more information than required by law? Recent studies have showed that companies enjoy several 
benefits with increased disclosure, like for instance: lower cost of equity capital, lower cost of debt, greater 
market liquidity and more analyst following (Botosan, 1997). However, if companies do not disclose all the 
information they have, i.e. they are not fully transparent, one should presume that there are costs involved with 
voluntary disclosure, like for example, costs related to personnel and certification (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008) and 
property costs, regarding the disclosure of an information that is strategic to the company (Verrecchia, 2001). 
There are various objectives due to which mostly firms are interested in the voluntary disclosure of the 
information. It is essential for the accountants and users of the financial statements to understand that why firms 
voluntary disclose information about their operations (Verrecchia, 2001). Financials managers in business firms 
want to have a sound disclosure policy to access the paybacks for running of business operations e-g adequate 
disclosure results in better relationship between business firm and audited firms. Stanga (1976) claimed that 
analysts have incredible effect in investment market, which build the investors’ confidence to make the 
investment decisions.The firm-specific characteristics are most important which are taken into account in this 
research. Several researchers provided the evidence that in various national studies that variety of firm-specific 
characteristics have a significant relationship with the level of voluntary disclosure in advance and emerging 
markets (Buzby, 1975).The purpose of the present study is effects of agency theory and signaling theory on the 
level of voluntary disclosure. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Before presenting the theoretical framework of this research, we consider that it’s relevant to give thedefinition 
of voluntary disclosure because it will limit the scope of our investigation. At this level, previous studies are 
divided into two parts (Pourtier, 2004): Those who do not define the voluntary disclosure (for example Xiao et 
al. (2004) and those that present it in opposition to mandatory one (Chavent et al. 2005, Raffournier, 1995, 
Cooke, 1992). But these definitions are incomplete because they don’t care about the dimensions of voluntary 
disclosure given by Pourtier (2004) which are: The content, the chronological sequence of publications and the 
vector chosen for publications. Thus, in this study, voluntary disclosure consists in voluntary publications 
regarding their content, disclosed in a mandatory vector (the annual report) and which are made in the 
chronological sequence provided by law. So we are dealing with only one of the dimensions of voluntary 
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disclosure which is the content. Precisely we deal with two categories of the dimension "content" which are 
information not provided in accounting laws and information which gives more details to mandatory 
publications. 
 
2-1.AGENCY THEORY 
Basic agency paradigm was developed in the economics literature during 1960s and 1970s in order to determine 
the optimal amount of the risk- sharing among different individuals (Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971; Ross, 1973; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Harris and Raviv 1976, 1978; Holmstrom, 1979). 
However, gradually the domain of the agency theory was extended to the management area for 
determining the cooperation between various people with different goals in the organization, and attainment of 
the goal congruency (Eisenhardt, 1989). In 1980s, agency theory was also appeared extensively in the 
managerial accoun-ting realms to determine the optimal-incentive contracting among different individuals and 
establishing suitable accounting control mechanisms to monitor their behaviors and actions (Demski, 1980; 
Biaman, 1982; Namazi, 1985). It is this last function of the agency theory that will be emphasized in this study. 
In its primitive form, agency theory relates to situations in which one individual (called the agent) is engaged by 
another individual (called the principal) to act on his/her behalf based upon a designated fee schedule. Since both 
individuals are assumed to be utility maximizer, and motivated by pecuniary and non-pecuniary items, incentive 
problems may arise, particularly under the condition of uncertainty and informational asymmetry. That is, the 
objective function of the principal and the agent may be incompatible, and therefore, the agent may take actions 
which will jeopardize the principal's benefits. In addition, an agency operates under the condition of risk and 
uncertainty. In effect, the basic agency theory usually assumes that both individuals are risk averse. Under this 
circumstances, the amount and content of the produced accounting information and other information sources 
would become a significant issue in risk sharing and controlling the agent's actions (Namazi, 1985; Baiman, 
1982, 1990). The preceding basic agency model, however, has also been extended to cases in which there are 
multiple agents (Holmstrom, 1979; Antle, 1982; Radner, 1981), private information (Penno, 1984), multiple 
period performance (Radner, 1981), and multi-objective models (Namazi, 1983). In addition, the effect of 
various cultures on the assumptions of the agency theory has also been investigated (Osterman, 2006; Kren and 
Tyson, 2009). Given the agency theory paradigm, and following Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Jensen and 
Meckling (1972), and Kaplan (1984), among others, a firm can be characterized as a nexuses of contractual 
agreements among different individuals, Mohammad Namazi(2013).  
 
2-2.signaling theory 
Signaling theory posits that firms with good performance tend to make voluntary disclosures more readily, 
as doing so is regarded as an easy means of distinguishing themselves from others in the marketplace. Hence,we 
conjecture that voluntary disclosure is positively related to firm performance and quality. Both Chow and Wong-
Boren (1987) and Lang and Lundholm (1993) provide empirical support for this supposition. 
• Liquidity 
Liquidity represents a firm’s ability to meet its short-term liabilities. Firms with greater liquidity are considered 
to be operating better businesses. In accordance with signaling theory, these firms are prone to disclose more 
information voluntarily (Cooke, 1989).2 Agency theory, in contrast, suggests the opposite conclusion: to 
alleviate information asymmetry, firms with less liquidity are likely to release more information to investors, 
creditors in particular. Indeed, several studies (e.g., Wallace et al., 1994) claim that weak liquidity may prompt 
firms to amplify their disclosure to justify their liquidity status. 
The empirical findings on the liquidity-disclosure relationship are also inconclusive. Wallace et al. 
(1994)document a negative relationship between liquidity and disclosure in both listed and unlisted Spanish 
companies, whereas Alsaeed (2006) and Barako et al. (2006) find no significant relationship in Saudi Arabia or 
Kenya. No previous study in China has taken liquidity into consideration. Using the current ratio as a proxy for 
liquidity, we conjecture that there is generally a positive relationship between the two in Chinese public 
companies, as stated in the following hypothesis. 
• Rate of return on equity of firm (ROE ) 
Under the signaling theory framework, firms with strong performance and good quality have more incentives to 
voluntarily disclose information to distinguish themselves from under performing firms. Singhvi and Desai 
(1971) claim that greater profitability may induce management to supply more information, to illustrate its 
ability, to maximize shareholder value, and to elevate managerial compensation. 
Auditor type (or rank) is popularly employed as a signal to the market. Financial reports audited by 
higher ranking auditors are regarded as better in quality and more credible. However, the literature provides 
mixed evidence in this respect. Using a relatively small dataset, Xiao et al. (2004) find a positive relationship 
between the Big 5 (or Big 4) auditors and internet-based voluntary disclosure in China.3 However, several 
studies (Hossain et al., 1995; Depoers, 2000; Alsaeed, 2006) have shown that neither Big 5 (nor Big 6) auditors 
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nor ROE have a significant influence on management’s disclosure decision. Yang Lan, Lili Wang,Xueyong 
Zhang(2013) 
 
2-3.voluntary disclosure 
We will classify determinants of voluntary disclosure in three groups (Lang and Lundholm, 1993, Wallace et al., 
1994, Camfferman and Cooke, 2002, Alsaeed, 2006). The first one is composed of the determinants related to 
the structure of the firm (Size of the firm, leverage, ownership concentration, board independence and firm age). 
The second group contain determinants related to firm’s performance (we will deal here only with one 
determinant with is profitability). The latest group includes market related determinants (industry type and audit 
firm size). 
• Firm size 
The relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm size is explained essentially by the agency theory. 
According to Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) accounting practices and voluntary disclosures are supposed to 
control conflicts of interest between shareholders, creditors and managers. This conflict of interest depends on 
some characteristics of the firm.They explained, based on the amount of external capital and referring to the 
work of Jensen and Meckling (1986) and those of Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981), that agency costs 
increase with the amount of external capital which increase with the size of the firm. This leads to an increase in 
the benefits of the contract connecting shareholders, creditors and managers simultaneously with the size of the 
firm. These benefits include financial disclosures. Disclosure’s costs are also used to explain the positive 
association between the level of voluntary disclosure and the size of the firm (Raffournier 1995). In addition to 
agency theory, political costs’s theory is also used. Indeed, large firms face high visibility and are subject to 
governmental interventions. In order to reduce these political costs, larger firms are moving towards a greater 
voluntary disclosure to reassure social and governmental groups (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). It is also 
important to say that large firms have their place within their industry or at least have managed to create and 
maintain their market share. So, the disclosure of favorable information about their activities is not likely to 
threaten their competitive advantage, which is unfortunately the case for small firms (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
Ahmed and Courtis (1999) argue that large companies disclose more information due to their business portfolio 
which is developed enough and the presence of several owners that have different information needs. The 
majority of studies collected were able to prove the existence of a positive and significant relationship (to 
different degrees of significance) between firm size and the level of voluntary disclosure. (Raffournier, 1995 for 
Switzerland, Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987, for Mexico, Cooke, 1992, for Japan, and Zeghal et al. 2007 for 
Canada). 
• Leverage 
According to the agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976), a situation of information asymmetry exists 
between creditors and the company. Lenders have no idea about the activity of the firm, but they are convinced 
that greater the amount of debt is, greater will be the managerial discretion to divert resources (Ahmed and 
Courtis, 1999). To cope with this situation, creditors will introduce controls which costs will be borne by the 
firm. To reassure them and reduce these costs, managers will have to disclose more information about the firm. 
But for firms who propose to borrow capital, another explanation may be advanced. Indeed, firms tend to 
disclose more information in the annual report when they are seeking to raise capital. These disclosures are 
intended to lower the cost of debt. The estimated debt risk by lenders will be minimized in presence of 
information on the activity of the firm and especially on its continuity (Ahmed 1994). Results related to this 
determinant are non-conclusive (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). Some researchers have been able to reach a positive 
and significant relationship (Naser et al., 2006, Barako 2007) while others have not been able to prove the 
existence of relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure and the level of debt (Chow and Wong-Boren, 
1987, Raffournier, 1995). 
• Ownership concentration 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983) when the capital of the firm is more dispersed there is more possibility to 
conflicts of interest between principal and agent to occur.To reduce these conflicts, some shareholders will tend 
to require managers to disclose more information in order to evaluate the performance of the firm (Lakhal, 
2004). So it’s intended that voluntary disclosure will be more important in capital diffused firms (Chau and 
Gary, 2002). Ho and Wong (2001) explain that for companies with highly concentrated ownership, conflict of 
interest is not between shareholders and managers but between majority and minority shareholders. In this 
situation, managers are encouraged to act against the interests of small shareholders by withholding information. 
Chau and Gray (2002) showed statistically, for companies of Hong Kong and Singapore, that more the capital of 
the firm is diffused, more it will make disclosures voluntarily. 
Lakhal (2004) empirically validated the hypothesis of a positive relationship between the diffusion of 
ownership and disclosure of earnings forecasts. But, Raffournier (1995) and Naser et al. (2006) could not prove 
the existence of a positive relationship between the dispersion of capital and the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.13, 2015 
 
129 
• Board independence 
The agency theory states that the presence of increasingly high external directors on the board helps to control 
and limit the opportunism of managers thanks to their competence, independence and objectivity necessary for 
the function of control (Ho and Wong, 2001). Indeed, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the presence of more 
outside directors (non-executive) makes the board more effective so the company will have to disclose more. In 
the same vein, Forcker (1992) showed that a high percentage of non-executive directors on the board increase 
the control of the quality of financial disclosures and reduced profits from withholding information. Ho and 
Wong (2001), Zeghal et al. (2007) and Lakhal (2004) were unable to validate their hypotheses of a positive 
relationship between the degree of independence of the board and the level of voluntary disclosure. Arcay and 
Vasquez (2005), on a sample of Spanish companies, have been able to prove empirically that the independence 
of the Board and subsequently the adoption of good governance rules promote voluntary disclosure. Contrary to 
this, the results of Eng and Mak (2003) who worked on a sample of companies listed on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange, showed the presence of a negative relationship between the degree of independence of the Board and 
the level of voluntary disclosure. They explain their results by the fact that the presence of a fairly high 
percentage of outside directors will act as a substitute for other governance mechanism namely the voluntary 
disclosure. 
• Age of the firm 
Studies of the relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm age are not multiple and rely very largely on 
logical reason. Courtis (2004), in his study of the determinants of intentional release of non-clear and not 
understandable information by firms, explains that a senior company have necessarily acquired habits of 
disclosure through the development of an information system and sophisticated communication strategies in 
addition to employing specialized staff for the preparation of annual reports which pushes them to publish clear, 
comprehensible and more detailed reports than younger firms. Akhtaruddin (2005) in his study of the 
determinants of voluntary disclosure in Bangladesh, argues that older firms are more experienced and are 
therefore more likely to include more information in their annual reports to improve their image and reputation 
on the market. In addition to this logical argument based on the experience of the firm, we believe that the theory 
of competitive advantage can be invoked to argue the relationship that may exist between this determinant (age 
of the firm) and voluntary disclosure. Indeed, an old company has certainly positioned itself in the market and 
within its industry by acquiring a competitive advantage. Therefore, aged firms are not afraid of the reactions of 
their competitors consequently to their publications because they were able over time to anticipate and knew 
how to face them. We can say that these firms have acquired a competitive advantage even at the informational 
level. Few studies have investigated this determinant. The age of the firm was quoted by Camferman and Cooke 
(2002) as a new variable to consider in order enriching the literature on the determinants of voluntary disclosure. 
Akhtaruddin (2005) investigated the relation between the age of the firm and its level of voluntary 
disclosure. He has not been able to establish statistically a positive association between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and the age of the firm. Alsaeed (2006) studied the impact of the age of Saudi firms on their level of 
voluntary disclosure and has been able to prove a positive and significant association between these two 
variables. Ansha (1998) also obtained a positive and significant relationship at 5%. 
• Performance- related determinants 
Companies that are conducting or achieve a high degree of profitability will try to disclose more voluntarily to 
report it to the market and reduce the information asymmetry (Eccles et al., 2001). Singhvi and Desai (1971) 
argue that an important profitability motivates managers to disclose more information in order to increase the 
confidence of investors who will be able to increase managers’ market compensation. The relationship between 
the degree of profitability and the level of voluntary disclosure has been widely studied. But the results are far 
from conclusive. Indeed, some authors have led to a positive relationship between the level of profitability of the 
firm and the level of voluntary disclosure. We can mention at this level Lakhal (2004) who was interested in the 
French context and who confirmed the hypothesis that firms that have a higher degree of profitability will tend to 
disclose more about their expected results. Similarly, Chavent et al. (2005) demonstrated empirically that the 
greater the degree of profitability is greater the voluntary disclosure on provision will be for French firms. On the 
other hand there are those who obtained statistically no relationship between the degree of profitability of the 
firm and the level of voluntary disclosure. We can mention at this level Raffournier (1995) for the case of 
Switzerland and Ahmed and Courtis (1999) for the meta-analysis. 
There are studies, despite having made the assumption of a positive correlation between the degree of 
profitability of the firm and the level of voluntary disclosure, their statistical results showed a negative 
relationship. We can mention Camfferman and Cooke (2002), Balkaoui andKahl (1978) and Wallace and Naser 
(1995). 
• The size of the audit firm 
Raffournier (1995) argues that auditors in general play an important role in the definition of financial 
communication policy for their customers. Large audit firms encourage companies to disclose audited additional 
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information and be more transparent. Against by, the smaller firms do not influence their customers but try to 
align their needs for fear of losing them by forcing them to publish more information Alsaeed, 2006). Big audit 
firmsand internationally renowned ones are found to have a positive influence on levels of disclosure of their 
customers. But the empirical results are inconclusive at this level. Camfferman and Cooke (2002) and Nasser et 
al. (2002) found a positive and significant relationship between the size of the audit firm and the level of 
voluntary disclosure. Raffournier (1995) support this positive relationship only when he rejected the variable 
firm size suggesting that this latter variable capted the effect of the variable size of the audit firm. Ahmed and 
Courtis (1999), Ansah (1998) and Alsaeed (2006) led to the absence of relationship between firm size and the 
level of voluntary disclosure. Wallace and Naser (1995), meanwhile, showed the presence of a negative 
relationship between the size of the audit firm and the extent of disclosure level. 
• The type of industry 
Some characteristics specific to an industry such as the degree of competition within the industry, product 
differentiation, the industry’s structure (monopoly or oligopoly) and growth can give rise to differences in the 
policies of communications. (Leventis and Weetman, 2004). Cooke (1992) argues that the manufacturing sector 
is exposed on the international level, thereby causing an effect on disclosure practices in this sector. Zeghal et al. 
(2007) suggest several reasons that lead some firms in a sector to disclose more than others belonging to another 
one. First, they argue that proprietary costs vary by industry due to the differences in the levels of 
competitiveness, the type of private information and hazard due to entry of new firms in the sector. Second, and 
based on the theory of signals, they explain that within the same sector, companies are required to align with 
each other about their disclosure practices because any deviation will be considered as bad news by the market. 
Several previous studies used the theory of political costs to highlight the influence of the industry type, to which 
the company belongs on its level of disclosure. Raffournier (1995) has not been able to confirm the relationship 
between the type of industry and the level of voluntary disclosure. But Ho and Wong (2001) and Cooke (1992) 
showed that manufacturing firms voluntarily disclose more than others belonging to other sectors. Zeghal et al 
(2007) argue that companies belonging to the sector of biotechnology industries disclose more about their 
research and development activities. Lakhal (2004) also argues that firms in the high technology sector disclose 
more about earnings forecasts. She adds that firms belonging to sectors subject to significant price volatility do 
too. Meriem Jouirou, Mohamed Bechir Chenguel,(2014). 
 
3-RESEARCH  HYPOTHESES 
This section develops  hypotheses that are subjected to statistical testing. These hypotheses are developed with 
reference to two well-known theories, agency theory, and signaling theory, which are briefly reviewed here in 
the context of voluntary disclosure. This review and discussion provide the foundation and justification for the 
explanatory variables extracted and considered in our hypothesis development. 
Hypotheses of this study are as follows:  
The first group of hypotheses:  
H1: There is a significant relationship between  voluntary disclosure and leverage.     
H2: There is a significant relationship between voluntary disclosure and fixed assets.  
The second group of hypotheses: 
H1: There is a significant relationship between voluntary disclosure and ROE.  
H2: There is a significant relationship between voluntary disclosure and Liquidity. 
 
4-VARIABLES DEFINITIONS 
4-1. Independent  variable:   
Signaling theory variables 
• Liquidity: It is the ratio of current assets to liabilities 
• ROE: It is the ratio of net income to equity 
Agency theory variables 
• Leverage: It is the ratio of total  liabilities to total assets 
• ratio of fixed assets: It is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets 
 
4-2.dependent variables 
Note that in this study we want to study  signaling theory and agency theory on voluntary disclosure so  the 
variable of  voluntary disclosure is as the dependent variable. As was stated in the study to quantify disclosure 
variable is used from  the list of points disclosure and transparency of companies Tehran Stock Exchange 
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These Variables are summarized in the table (1). 
Table( 1):Description of the variables 
Names of the 
Variables 
Proxies 
 
Calculations 
 
DSCOREit Disclosure of firm i in period t The list of points  disclosure and transparency of 
companies Tehran Stock Exchange 
LMVit Financial leverage of firm i in 
period t 
The ratio of total  liabilities to total assets 
FA/Ait Fixed assets of firm i in period 
t 
The ratio of fixed assets to total assets 
Liquidityit Liquidity of firm i in period t The ratio of current assets to  liabilities 
ROEit Rate of return on equity of 
firm i in period t 
The ratio of net income to  quity 
 
5-METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS 
In this study, the multiple regressions are used for data analysis. Initial data was inserted in  Excel spreadsheet 
and SPSS software was applied to analyze the data statistically. Also Rahavard Novin software, Tadbir Pardaz 
software, stock organization library and stock sites such as www.rdis.ir & www.irbourse.com were used. 
 
6-RESEARCH METHOD AND REGRESSION MODEL 
Considering that the aim of this study was to examine the relationship between agency theory and signaling 
theory on the level of voluntary disclosure  
First of all variables in the model study in a multiple regression model tested general form it is as follows: 
 
 
7-SAMPLE SELECTION 
The sample was chosen from the firms listed on the Tehran stock exchange (TSE), from 2008to2013, using the 
following criteria: 
1). Firms were listed in TSE during2008 -2013  
2). Data was available for all the years under the  study. 
3). The companies didn’t have changed the fiscal year for the period studied. 
4). Banks, Insurance and Investment firms were not considered in this study. 
 
8-DATA ANALYSIS 
• Testing Results of the first group hypothesis: 
In  the Model 1:  
 
Table (2):Variables Entered 
 
We entered variables into the model respectively. models were defined and finally the last model including 1 
variables was defined as an optimum model for predicting the voluntary disclosure. As a result, the regression 
model came as the followings: 
 
Table (3):Excluded Variables 
VIf Partial Correlation Sig t Beta ln Variable model 
1.002 -0.92 0.52 -1.949 -0.041 LMVit 1 
As it is seen,LMV
 
significance level is equal to 0.52> 0.05, therefore, this variable was not entering the model. 
Optimum model was model 2, which had a more determination coefficient than the previous ones 
 
  
 
DSCOREit=α0+α1 LMVit+α2FA/Ait+α3Liquidityit+ α4ROEit+ ἐ 
Method Durbin-Watson Adjusted R Square Variables Entered Model 
Step wise 652/1 116 /0  /	, 1 
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Table (5):Coefficients of model 2 
 
VIF 
 
Sig 
 
t 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
 
Model4 
Beta Stl. 
Erro 
B 
 0.000 15/14  2/457 37/205 Constant 
1/2 0/024 2/368 0/110 5/790 13/132 
 
/	, 
The optimal regression model was written as the following: 
DSCOREit=37/205+ 13/132FA/Ait + ἐ 
• The results of the first model tests  
According to the statistical results of the first group hypothesis to test the research, the first group, Of the two 
independent variables  one variable ratio of fixed assets the company
  
has positive and a significant impact on the 
voluntary disclosure. Also , as  reflected in the relationship between the variables in the model can be seen, If 
disclosure of corporate information is evaluated based on agency theory ; Variable ratio of fixed assets the 
company has a direct connection with the disclosure of company ,. Thus expected  to increase the proportion of 
fixed assets , The extent of voluntary disclosure by companies to increase. Meanwhile,   based on table (6) the 
first group test suggests that ,one independent variable has a significant relationship with the company's 
disclosure (F= @.   /000), which together offer a 11 % (AdjR 2 = 0/116) Explains the behavior of the dependent 
variable. 
• Testing Results of the second group hypothesis 
In  the Model 2:  
,  =  + ,  +  +   
 
Table (4) 
Variables Entered 
We entered variables into the model respectively. models were defined and finally the last model including 1 
variables was defined as an optimum model for predicting the voluntary disclosure. As a result, the regression 
model came as the followings: 
 
Table (5):Excluded Variables 
VIf Partial Correlation Sig t Beta ln Variable model 
1.002 -0.92 0.52 -1.949 -0.041 ROEit 1 
As it is seen ,ROE significance level is equal to 0.52> 0.05, therefore, this variable was not entering the model. 
 
Table (6):Coefficients of model 2 
 
VIF 
 
Sig 
 
t 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
 
Model4 
Beta Stl. Erro B 
 0.000 525/14   395/2  783/37  Constant 
4/1  001/0  477/3  167/0  898/1  600/6  
 
Liquidityit 
The optimal regression model was written as the following:
 
• The results of the second model tests  
According to the statistical results of the second group hypothesis to test the research, Of the two independent 
variables one variable Liquidity
  
has positive and a significant impact on the voluntary disclosure. Also , as  
reflected in the relationship between the variables in the model can be seen, If disclosure of corporate 
information is evaluated based on signaling theory ; Variable Liquidity company has a direct relationship with 
the company's disclosure , Thus expected  to increase Liquidity , The extent of voluntary disclosure by 
companies to increase. Meanwhile,   based on table (6) the second group test suggests that ,one independent 
variable has a significant relationship with the company's disclosure (F= @.   /000), which together offer a 26% 
(AdjR 2 = .261) Explains the behavior of the dependent variable.. 
 
Method Durbin-Watson Adjusted R Square Variables Entered Model 
Step wise 584/1 261 /0  Liquidityit 1 
DSCOREit=β0+ β1Liquidityit+ ἐ               
DSCOREit=37/783+ 6/600 Liquidityit + ἐ                          
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9-Conclusion 
In this study, the effect of agency theory and signaling theory has been assessed on the level of voluntary 
disclosure of listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. In this regard, two models was reviewed, the 
relationship between ratio of fixed assets, Leverage, ROE, Liquidity on the level of voluntary disclosure. 
According to the results of statistical models to test the research, the first model, the ratio of fixed 
assets was extremely positive and significant, while Leverage was negative and significant. Thus, it can be 
claimed that the increase in the ratio of fixed assets would increase the voluntary disclosure. 
In the second model, , Liquidity of company was positive and significant. So when disclosure of 
corporate information is evaluated based on signaling theory ; it confirms this with the increase in , Liquidity ,the 
voluntary disclosure will increase. 
we find evidence that differs from the findings of previous studies, For instance, Yang Lan, Lili 
Wang,Xueyong Zhang(2013) Used a sample representing more than 80% of all public companies in China, they 
found that firm size, leverage, assets-in-place, ROE, and ownership diffusion 
are significantly associated with voluntary disclosure and that auditor type and the intermediary and 
legalenvironments are highly significantly associated with voluntary disclosure.  
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